Absurd Overlap: Snap Removal and the Rule of Unanimity by Temple, Travis
William & Mary Law Review 
Volume 63 (2021-2022) 
Issue 1 Article 7 
10-2021 
Absurd Overlap: Snap Removal and the Rule of Unanimity 
Travis Temple 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Repository Citation 
Travis Temple, Absurd Overlap: Snap Removal and the Rule of Unanimity, 63 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
321 (2021), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol63/iss1/7 
Copyright c 2021 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
ABSURD OVERLAP: SNAP REMOVAL AND THE RULE OF
UNANIMITY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
I. SNAP REMOVAL: FUNCTION, ORIGIN, AND TREATMENT . . . . . . 323
A. Removal Generally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
B. Snap Removal Functionally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
C. The Snap Removal Movement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
D. Scholarly Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
II. THE RULE OF UNANIMITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
A. Unanimity in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
B. Purpose and Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
III. UNANIMITY AND SNAP REMOVAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
A. Logical Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
B. Textualist Applications of Unanimity to Snap Removal
Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
C. Evaluation of Textualist Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
IV. A NONLEGISLATIVE SOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
A. Proposed Judicial Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
B. Comparison to Other Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
321
322 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:321
INTRODUCTION
American media and pop culture are filled with depictions of
crafty lawyers using strained loopholes to escape the consequences
of a rule.1 Despite this cultural fixation on narrowly avoiding
liability, real courts all across the judicial system rule against
parties who attempt to manufacture favorable results in this way.2
These rulings stand for the principle that, during the administration
of justice, the purpose and end result of a law are often equally as
important as its bare terms in writing.3 However, recent decisions
at the federal appellate level concerning “snap removal”4 have el-
evated form over function.5
Snap removal employs “a literalist approach” to the statute
governing the procedural mechanism for removing cases from state
court to federal court.6 In a typical removal scenario, defendants
sued in state court would have the option to be heard in federal
court instead, given that certain conditions are satisfied.7 As
discussed below, snap removal essentially allows the defendants to
forego a condition that would bar removal if they can file before the
plaintiff formally notifies them of the lawsuit.8 This practice of
1. As an example in contemporary fiction, a side character in NBC’s The Good Place tries
to use his legal expertise to argue his way into a better afterlife using an “obscure precedent”
from an old, forgotten rulebook. See The Good Place: Michael’s Gambit (NBC television
broadcast Jan. 19, 2017).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012) (first quoting
Landstar Express Am., Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 569 F.3d 493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009); then
quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)) (“An interpretation is absurd when
it ‘defies rationality,’ or renders the statute ‘nonsensical and superfluous.’”); In re Kaiser
Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2006) (“A basic tenet of statutory construction is
that courts should interpret a law to avoid absurd or bizarre results.”).
3. See Fontaine, 697 F.3d at 228.
4. Here, snap removal is in quotes because the term is neither universal nor official.
Some courts refer to it by name, while others refer to it in the abstract. Compare Tex. Brine
Co. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, 955 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2020) (referring to snap removal directly),
with Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 2019) (approving of snap
removal without naming it). Hereinafter, snap removal is referred to without quotations.
5. See discussion infra Part I.C.
6. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main & David McClure, Snap Removal: Concept;
Cause; Cacophony; and Cure, 72 BAYLOR L. REV. 423, 440 (2020).
7. See, e.g., id. at 436.
8. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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removing a case before being served with formal process—essen-
tially an act of gamesmanship of the civil procedure system—has
gained appellate support over the past two years, making its
application valid and uniform across three circuits.9 Now that the
practice has garnered traction, federal courts moving forward will
not only have to adopt it as a valid rule, but also grapple with its
application when it inevitably collides with other laws and pro-
cedures.10 In particular, the rule of unanimity, requiring that all
codefendants consent to a removal,11 could present a unique
challenge in snap removal cases.12
This Note argues that, when applied in conjunction with the rule
of unanimity, the reasoning underlying snap removal’s approval will
present a contradictory and ultimately absurd result in certain
factual scenarios. Therefore, the potential future applications of
snap removal lend credence to its disapproval in the present. Part
I discusses the function and rationale of snap removal, and Part II
does the same for the unanimity rule. Part III analyzes the effects
of these two concepts colliding in the same case using hypothetical
examples and analogous case law. It further argues that simulta-
neous application of both snap removal and the rule of unanimity
can give sole discretion over removal to the forum defendant,
standing in stark contrast to the relevant statutory scheme. Finally,
Part IV argues that courts should rely on this contradiction to
dismiss snap removal as an absurd interpretation of the removal
statutes. Lastly, it compares the merits of this approach to proposed
legislative solutions.
I. SNAP REMOVAL: FUNCTION, ORIGIN, AND TREATMENT
Analyzing snap removal and the rule of unanimity together would
not be possible without a robust discussion of each individually.
This Part sets the foundation for analyzing snap removal by first
9. See Tex. Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 485; Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 705; Encompass Ins. Co. v.
Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 153-54 (3d Cir. 2018).
10. See infra Part III.A-C.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).
12. See infra Part III.A-C.
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looking at regular removal and then moving on to snap removal’s
function, history, and relevant scholarship.
A. Removal Generally
Understanding the rights and limitations of removal itself is
necessary to understand snap removal. The defendant’s ability to
remove to federal court a case that originated in state court comes
from statutory authority.13 Section 1441 of Title 28 of the United
States Code provides that the defendant in a civil action may
remove the case if the federal court would have “original jurisdic-
tion,” meaning the plaintiff could have brought the suit in federal
court initially.14 Therefore, removal overrides the plaintiff’s choice
of forum.15
Section 1441 places limitations on this ability to override, cat-
egorized by the type of subject matter jurisdiction the case would
have in federal court.16 Most notably, § 1441(b)(2) sets a key lim-
itation on removing cases brought under diversity of citizenship: the
forum-defendant rule.17 District courts have the authority to hear
cases involving parties that are citizens of two different states under
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), otherwise known as diversity cases.18 The
rationale for providing diversity jurisdiction is that the out-of-state
party may be subject to prejudice from the decision makers native
to the state simply for being a foreign person or entity.19 The forum-
defendant rule restricts removal of diversity cases by barring
defendants from going to federal court when any of the defendants
are citizens of the state in which the action is brought.20 This rule
13. See § 1441(a).
14. See id.; see also 14C JOAN E. STEINMAN, MARY KAY KANE & A. BENJAMIN SPENCER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (4th ed. 2020).
15. See STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3721.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)-(f). Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter
jurisdiction, and only certain categories of cases will be heard. See id. §§ 1331, 1332. Most
notably, these categories include cases centered around questions of federal law and diversity
of citizenship cases. See id.
17. See id. § 1441(b)(2); see also STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3723.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). A minimum amount in controversy of more than $75,000 is also
required under this statute, but this requirement is not germane to any of the concepts
discussed in this Note. See id.
19. 13E ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601 (3d ed. 2020).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
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emphasizes diversity citizenship’s purpose of avoiding bias; if the
defendants are from the state where the action is brought, they need
not fear bias against them based on citizenship.21
B. Snap Removal Functionally
Defendants using snap removal hone in on a particular phrase in
§ 1441(b)(2) to avoid the effects of the forum-defendant rule.22 The
rule states that actions “may not be removed if any of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the
State in which such action is brought.”23 Crafty forum defendants
have taken this to mean that the forum-defendant rule does not
apply to them when they have not been formally served with notice
of the suit by the plaintiff, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.24 Now referred to as snap removal, removing a case
before being served is the subject of considerable litigation and
scholarly review.25
While not immediately intuitive, in practice, snap removal falls
into a few factually distinct categories. The first scenario, referred
to as a “race-to-the-courthouse” by leading scholars, requires the
defendant to have ample resources.26 Defendants with the ability to
do so, especially larger corporations, can monitor public court
dockets for suits filed against them and attempt to file for removal
before the plaintiff has a chance to serve them.27 The second sce-
nario arises when the plaintiff reaches out to the defendant with a
prenotice request, such as a request for waiver of the notice
requirement.28 This gives the defendant an opportunity to remove
before the formal notice can be effectuated.29 The last scenario
occurs when the plaintiff serves codefendants at different times.30
21. See Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 432-33.
22. See id. at 441.
23. § 1441(b)(2) (emphasis added).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c).
25. See, e.g., Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 153-54 (3d
Cir. 2018); Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 452-53.
26. Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 446-47.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 447-48.
29. See id.
30. See id.
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If the plaintiff serves a nonforum defendant, that nonforum defen-
dant can alert a forum codefendant of the lawsuit, allowing the
forum codefendant to remove the case before being served.31 In all
of these circumstances, the essential factor is that the forum defen-
dant receives some kind of informal notice before being served.32
C. The Snap Removal Movement
The relevant language in § 1441(b)(2) has been in place since
1948, but the practice of snap removal did not proliferate until the
mid-2000s.33 The ability to monitor dockets efficiently and communi-
cate instantly, two key ingredients in the snap removal recipe, were
not feasible until the age of the internet.34 Snap removal received a
push toward widespread acceptance in 2001, when the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals gave it passing approval in a footnote, though this
was dicta.35 It gained popularity around 2007, creating a split be-
tween district courts about whether to accept or reject the practice
as a statutory interpretation question.36
Coming down on the rejection side of the split, Vivas v. Boeing Co.
led the charge against snap removal when it began to gain steam
around 2007.37 Following the defendant’s attempt at snap removal,
the plaintiffs moved to remand back to Illinois state court.38 Holding
in favor of the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, the district court rea-
soned that snap removal runs counter to the legislative intent of the
forum-defendant rule.39 As the court specified, the language intends
to curb fraudulent joinder of codefendants, “prevent[ing] a plaintiff
from blocking removal by joining as a defendant a resident party
against whom it does not intend to proceed, and whom it does not
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 451.
34. See id. at 482.
35. See McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 813 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001).
36. Compare Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 864 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(rejecting snap removal), with Watanabe v. Lankford, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1219 (D. Haw.
2010) (holding in favor of snap removal).
37. 486 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734-35 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
38. Id. at 728.
39. See id. at 734-35.
2021] SNAP REMOVAL AND THE RULE OF UNANIMITY 327
even serve.”40 Therefore, the defendant’s snap removal, and the
practice more generally, frustrated Congress’s intent and defeated
a plain meaning interpretation.41 Other district courts rejecting the
practice have taken up similar lines of reasoning.42
Standing in opposition to the Vivas approach, North v. Precision
Airmotive Corp. is indicative of the rulings in favor of snap re-
moval.43 North presents the typical “race-to-the-courthouse” case, in
which the defendant receives notice by monitoring state dockets.44
While ruling in favor of the snap-removing defendants, the court
reasoned that the contrary result created by snap removal does not
lead to an “absurd” outcome and thus should not defeat the statute’s
plain meaning.45 Further, the court recognized that Congress likely
did not anticipate this result, but nonetheless put the onus on the
legislature to fix it.46
This district-level split remained unsettled until well over a de-
cade later, when the Third Circuit Court of Appeals took up the
plain meaning approach in 2018.47 As the first appellate court to
formally uphold snap removal,48 the Third Circuit reiterated lower
court authority in Encompass Insurance Co. v. Stone Mansion Res-
taurant, Inc.49 On review of the district court’s decision, the circuit
court denied a motion to remand that turned on the propriety of
snap removal, citing the “unambiguous” wording of the operative
statute to approve the practice.50 After Encompass Insurance Co.’s
emphasis on a lack of “an absurd or bizarre result,”51 the Second
40. Id. at 734 (quoting Holmstrom v. Harad, No. 05C2714, 2005 WL 1950672, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 11, 2005)).
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., Lone Mountain Ranch, LLC v. Santa Fe Gold Corp., 988 F. Supp. 2d 1263,
1267 (D.N.M. 2013); Perez v. Forest Lab’ys, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1246 (E.D. Mo. 2012).
43. Compare Vivas, at 734-35, with 600 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269-70 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
44. See North, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
45. See id. at 1269-70.
46. See id. at 1270.
47. See Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 153-54 (3d Cir.
2018).
48. This is notwithstanding the McCall v. Scott footnote dicta. See 239 F.3d 808, 813 n.2
(6th Cir. 2001).
49. See 902 F.3d at 153-54 (“[T]his result may be peculiar in that it allows [the defendant]
to use preservice machinations to remove a case that it otherwise could not; however, the
outcome is not so outlandish as to constitute an absurd or bizarre result.”).
50. Id. at 152.
51. Id. at 153-54.
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Circuit followed suit a year later in 2019, citing Encompass Insur-
ance Co. and its reasoning while deciding Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co.52 Similarly, in 2020 the Fifth Circuit became the latest
court of appeals to assent to snap removal, incorporating the pre-
vious two decisions into its own opinion in Texas Brine Co. v.
American Arbitration Ass’n.53 With three appellate circuits creating
the same precedent and none deciding the opposite, the judiciary
has been trending overwhelmingly in the direction of approving
snap removal under a textualist approach.54
D. Scholarly Critique
Although the judicial trend has shifted considerably towards
approval, academics have taken a much more critical approach to
snap removal.55 In fact, the discourse surrounding the practice
focuses on who should get rid of it and how, not whether it should
be done away with in the first place.56 This may be unsurprising,
given that the judicial opinions giving force to snap removal often
contain a call to action for Congress to nullify it.57
Accordingly, a prevailing argument outside the judiciary is that
snap removal should be cut off by legislation.58 Arthur Hellman and
his colleagues identify why this approach could be the most effective
option.59 At the time of their writing, the appellate circuits had not
yet ruled on snap removal, and they reasoned that a solution was
52. 919 F.3d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[W]hile it might seem anomalous to permit a de-
fendant sued in its home state to remove a diversity action, the language of the statute cannot
be simply brushed aside.”).
53. 955 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The plain-language reading of the forum-defendant
rule as applied in this case does not justify a court’s attempt to revise the statute.”).
54. See id. at 485; Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 705; Encompass Ins. Co., 902 F.3d at 153-54;
McCall, 239 F.3d at 813 n.2.
55. See, e.g., Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 423-24; Valerie M. Nannery, Closing the Snap
Removal Loophole, 86 CIN. L. REV. 541, 541-42 (2018); Arthur Hellman, Lonny Hoffman,
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Joan Steinman & Georgene Vairo, Neutralizing the Stratagem of “Snap
Removal”: A Proposed Amendment to the Judicial Code, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 103, 103-04
(2016).
56. See, e.g., Nannery, supra note 55, at 541-42; Hellman et al., supra note 55, at 103-04.
57. See North v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (M.D. Fla. 2009)
(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005)) (“[I]f Congress
intends a different result, ‘it is up to Congress rather than the courts to fix it.’”).
58. See, e.g., Hellman et al., supra note 55, at 108.
59. See id. at 108-09.
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unlikely to come from the Supreme Court because no circuit split
existed.60 Although the case law has changed in the years following,
this remains true because the circuits are uniformly in agreement
so far.61 If anything, this unanimity would further emphasize their
call for the legislature to intervene. Additionally, Hellman and his
colleagues propose a legislative fix designed to block snap removal
and change nothing else.62 This is important because, as the case
law points out, the “properly joined and served” language serves a
valid function that Congress intended to carry out.63 Hellman and
his colleagues propose an amendment that adds a specific prohibi-
tion on snap removal, leaving the rest of the operative statutes
untouched.64 Jeffrey Stempel and his colleagues propose a solution
with similar intentions by simply deleting the “and served” portion
of the statute.65
In addition to legislative fixes, Valerie Nannery proposes options
at the state level to curb instances of snap removal until a more
definitive end can be achieved.66 Specifically, Nannery lauds New
Jersey’s state court approach of reducing the lag time between when
a plaintiff can file suit and serve the defendant.67 However, this puts
the burden on plaintiffs to avoid snap removal more than it resolves
the underlying controversy,68 as it merely minimizes the effects
while waiting for the ultimate solution. Therefore, it appears widely
accepted in the academic sphere that the legislature should
intervene, but how that intervention should take form remains
debated.69
60. See id. at 106-07.
61. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
62. See Hellman et al., supra note 55, at 108-10.
63. See Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
64. See Hellman et al., supra note 55, at 110.
65. See Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 493.
66. See Nannery, supra note 55, at 583-84.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., id. at 575-85; Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 492-93; Hellman et al., supra
note 55, at 108-10.
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II. THE RULE OF UNANIMITY
Before evaluating snap removal and the unanimity rule in con-
junction, a primer on the latter is necessary. This Part gives a brief
summary of the function and purpose of the statutory rule.
A. Unanimity in Practice
In a typical removal situation, all defendants in the case must
consent to the removal for it to be effective, otherwise known as the
rule of unanimity.70 When the decision to remove is not unanimous,
a motion to remand the case back to state court is appropriate.71
Deriving from 28 U.S.C. § 1446, this principle appears simple on its
face.72 However, multiple factors can potentially complicate its
application, requiring a more robust understanding of its purpose
and judicial treatment.73
As a practical note in the backdrop of removal more general-
ly, defendants favor federal courts to state courts in most cases.74
Plaintiffs tend to sue corporations on account of their deeper
pockets, and corporate defendants tend to want the uniformity and
consistency offered by federal courts.75 Further, this is no mere
preference; federal courts are consistently more favorable to
defendants than state courts.76 Therefore, removal can be pivotal to
the outcome of a case.77 However, this reality also means that
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A); see also STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3730.
71. See STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3730.
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).
73. See Jayne S. Ressler, Removing Removal’s Unanimity Rule, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1391,
1396-98 (2013) (highlighting some of the difficulties of unanimity while ultimately arguing
for its repeal).
74. See id. at 1398-400.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1398 (“‘[T]here is a widespread perception among attorneys, litigants, and
policymakers’ alike that federal court provides defendants with a more favorable forum than
it does plaintiffs.” (quoting Thomas H. Cohen, Do Federal and State Courts Differ in How They
Handle Civil Trial Litigation: A Portrait of Civil Trials in State and Federal District Courts
2-3 (2d Ann. Conf. on Empirical Legal Stud. Paper, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=912691
[https://perma.cc/DBZ7-6QHW])).
77. The American Tort Reform Foundation regularly publishes an incredibly biased report
of “judicial hellholes,” ranking the top ten court systems that tend to rule for plaintiffs over
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usually all codefendants want to remove and will be in agreement
on that issue.78 This is not to say that defendants never have a
reason to refuse removal; rather, defendants are simply more likely
to gain from removal.79 Accordingly, in many cases the plaintiff is
trying to enforce the unanimity rule in order to defeat removal
(usually in conjunction with a timing requirement) rather than a
nonconsenting defendant moving to remand.80
Likely owing in some part to the fact that plaintiffs often seek to
enforce the rule, federal courts have created exceptions in favor of
retaining jurisdiction when codefendants have not been served pri-
or to the filing of removal.81 Cachet Residential Builders v. Gemini
Insurance Co. illustrates this point well.82 In that case, Cachet filed
suit against codefendants Gemini and Cromwell.83 Cachet improp-
erly served the defendants by sending notice via private carrier
rather than through the post office, and Gemini subsequently re-
moved without the consent of Cromwell.84 The court approved this
removal, reasoning that the rule of unanimity only requires formally
served defendants to consent.85 Thus, the plaintiff’s own neglect—or
under a more cynical view, their crafty attempt at gamesman-
ship—could not prevent the defendants from removing.86 However,
as Wright and Miller’s treatise, Federal Practice and Procedure,
makes clear, this principle is subject to caveats.87
defendants. See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., Judicial Hellholes: 2019/2020, 1 (2019), https://
www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ATRA_JH19_layout_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SRZ7-VXEZ]. The listing is consistently filled with state courts. See id.
78. See Ressler, supra note 73, at 1398-400.
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., Cachet Residential Builders, Inc. v. Gemini Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1028,
1029 (D. Ariz. 2007).
81. See id. at 1032; see also STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3730.
82. See Cachet Residential Builders, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1032.
83. Id. at 1029.
84. Id. at 1029-31.
85. See id. at 1031-32.
86. See id.
87. See STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3730. Prior to 1948, the presence of a resident
defendant blocked removal regardless of whether the resident defendant was served. See id.
(“[T]he presence in the action of a resident defendant was a bar to removal when jurisdiction
was based on diversity of citizenship, and that defect was not avoided or cured simply by a
failure to complete service of process on the resident defendant.”). 
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Federal courts created two important boundaries while allowing
removal in a case like Cachet.88 The first requires an explanation of
why any codefendants failed to consent to the otherwise unanimous
removal,89 and this has been widely adopted across the circuits
because it applies in all cases that implicate the rule of unanimity.90
A notice of removal requires, in all cases, “a short and plain state-
ment of the grounds for removal” generally,91 and the courts have
extended this idea to include an explanation for why removal is
valid in the absence of unanimous consent.92 A notice of removal is
facially deficient without these explanations, and there must be
convincing reasons to pass muster.93 Therefore, the absence of a
defendant’s consent would need to be explained by invoking a per-
mitted exception.94 Some district courts have implemented a second
boundary specific to unserved defendants like the ones in Cachet.95
Specifically, these courts require the unserved defendants to con-
sent to the removal if they received actual notice of the lawsuit
despite not receiving formal service of process.96 This barrier to non-
unanimous removal could have been critical for snap removal cases,
but the 2011 amendments to the removal statute (as discussed
below) and a Supreme Court ruling likely eroded the basis for its
application.97
88. See id.; Cachet Residential Builders, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1029-32.
89. See STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3730.
90. See, e.g., Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 68-69 (3d Cir. 1985); N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco
Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1982).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
92. See N. Ill. Gas Co., 676 F.2d at 272-73.
93. See Lewis, 757 F.2d at 68-69.
94. See id.
95. See STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3730; Teitelbaum v. Soloski, 843 F. Supp. 614,
615 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (creating an actual notice standard, where defendants are required to
join in the notice for removal if they receive any copy of the complaint); Schwartz v. FHP Int’l
Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1354, 1363-64 (D. Ariz. 1996) (implementing the framework established
in Teitelbaum).
96. See Teitelbaum, 843 F. Supp. at 615.
97. See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 356 (1999) (implicitly
overruling Schwartz and Teitelbaum by ruling on the service and timing requirements that
formed the basis of both cases); Ressler, supra note 73, at 1405-06.
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B. Purpose and Origin
The rule of unanimity began as a Supreme Court ruling in 1900
rather than a statutory provision.98 In Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railway v. Martin, the Supreme Court held that all parties
must join in the petition for removal.99 Interestingly, the Court
rooted its decision to enforce this requirement in the plaintiff’s
ability to choose how to litigate its case, the fear being that non-
consenting defendants would manage to split the case across
forums.100 The Court reasoned that the plaintiff’s choice to join the
defendants was vital,101 and the Court’s decision cemented the una-
nimity rule in this precedential form for over a century.102 Congress
codified certain parts of the unanimity rule in 2011 through an
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1446, largely in response to split au-
thority on the timing requirements for removal as they relate to
unanimity.103 Importantly, this amendment included the language
of § 1441, aligning the statute with previous interpretations of the
rule as well as paralleling it with the basis for snap removal.104
III. UNANIMITY AND SNAP REMOVAL
This Part argues that, in cases in which both issues arise, the rule
of unanimity and snap removal should be considered as concurrent,
rather than separate, issues. Under this approach, using the same
line of reasoning for both issues will produce a result that is
antithetical to the purpose of the forum-defendant rule.
98. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1900).
99. Id. at 248.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Ressler, supra note 73, at 1405-06.
103. See id.
104. See Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 153-54 (3d Cir.
2018); Cachet Residential Builders, Inc. v. Gemini Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1029 (D.
Ariz. 2007). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A), with § 1441(b)(2).
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A. Logical Consistency
Insight into the purpose behind the language in § 1446 shows
why the statute should be interpreted similarly to § 1441.105 Even
before the 2011 amendment regarding the unanimity rule, an ac-
cepted principle of the rule’s application was—and still is—that
fraudulently joined or “nominal” defendants need not consent to the
removal for it to be effective.106 Allowing the unanimity rule to
control in these situations would facilitate gamesmanship on the
plaintiff’s part; tangentially related defendants with no reason to
consent or participate could be joined for the sole purpose of
keeping the action in state court.107 When moving the rule from pre-
cedential to statutory authority, Congress drafted the legislation in
a way that would keep this consideration and other contours of the
unanimity rule in place, seeking to change only the discrepancies in
timing requirements.108 As mentioned in the above discussion of
§ 1441, Congress previously used the language of “properly joined
and served” to curtail the exact same problem for diversity removal
generally.109 Taking all of this together, the purpose must be the
same for including the language in both statutes, especially given
that the relevant portions of § 1446 mainly formalize what existed
prior to its adoption.110
With this similarity in mind, the only intellectually consistent
approach would be to apply the same interpretation to both §§ 1441
and 1446. In fact, now that some appellate circuits have weighed in
on snap removal, the courts have taken to doing so to each statute
independently.111 With respect to § 1446, the Tenth Circuit adopted
105. Compare § 1446(b)(2)(A), and Sheldon v. Khanal, 502 F. App’x 765, 770 (10th Cir.
2012), with § 1441(b)(2), and Encompass Ins. Co., 902 F.3d at 153-54.
106. See Brady v. Lovelace Health Plan, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1173 (D.N.M. 2007) (“First,
a nominal or formal party is not required to join in the petition for removal.... Second, a defen-
dant who has not yet been served with process is not required to join.” (citations omitted)).
107. See C.L.B. v. Frye, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1116 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (“Prior to service,
a defendant has no obligation to respond to a complaint or make a decision regarding
removal.”).
108. See Ressler, supra note 73, at 1402-06.
109. See discussion supra Part II.B.
110. See Ressler, supra note 73, at 1402-06.
111. Compare Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 153-54 (3d
Cir. 2018), with Sheldon v. Khanal, 502 F. App’x 765, 770 (10th Cir. 2012).
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the textualist approach in a case that did not involve the forum-
defendant rule, citing “the clear statutory language requiring only
served defendants to consent to removal.”112 As discussed above, this
is essentially the same argument that the Second, Third, and Fifth
Circuits used to hold in favor of snap removal.113
Therefore, courts condoning snap removal tactics would have
little to no leeway to give the unanimity rule different treatment
than the forum-defendant rule under the same factual scenario.
Facially, this appears simple and uncontroversial, but the potential
applications of this line of reasoning could have unintuitive and con-
tradictory results, as shown by the hypotheticals discussed below.114
It is important to recognize that the 2011 amendments to the
removal statutes and the subsequent textualist interpretations of
those statutes have created significant overlap between snap
removal and the rule of unanimity.115 Interpreting the rule of
unanimity to apply only to served defendants allows nonforum
defendants to evade the forum-defendant rule through their own
initiative by removing the case before service can be made on the
forum defendant.116 In practice, this is fundamentally no different
from snap removal, when the forum defendant itself can initiate the
removal process before being served.117 Therefore, any distinction
between the two scenarios is merely formalistic. The Wright and
Miller treatise refers to the practice as snap removal when initiated
by the forum defendant, and it refers to the rule of unanimity when
removal is initiated by the nonforum defendant.118 For the sake of
clarity, this Note takes the same approach of referring to the prac-
tices separately.
112. See Sheldon, 502 F. App’x at 770.
113. See discussion supra Part I.C.
114. See discussion infra Part III.B.
115. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A), and Sheldon, 502 F. App’x at 770, with
§ 1441(b)(2), and Encompass Ins. Co., 902 F.3d at 153-54.
116. See STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3723.
117. Compare id., with Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 439-42.
118. Compare STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3730, with id. § 3723.
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B. Textualist Applications of Unanimity to Snap Removal Cases
Simple hypotheticals best illustrate the interaction between
snap removal and the rule of unanimity, but a few assumptions
should be noted first. When using the textualist reasoning supplied
by appellate courts for interpreting §§ 1441 and 1446,119 the logical
result in a case involving nonconsenting defendants and snap
removal should vary based on the configuration of the parties.
Inherent to the factual situation that would give rise to these issues
simultaneously, there must be at least two defendants,120 and at
least one of those defendants must be an unserved forum defen-
dant.121 For the sake of argument, the number of codefendants in
each of the following examples is limited to two, as adding more
would unnecessarily complicate the analysis without creating
additional insight. Further, assume in each example that the de-
fendant who does not remove the case also does not consent to
removal.
In the first configuration (Scenario 1), the plaintiff files suit in
Virginia state court and does not serve Defendant A or Defendant
B with formal service of process before one of the defendants files for
removal to federal court. This would most likely result from a “race-
to-the-courthouse” scenario with docket monitoring.122 Regardless
of the citizenship of the defendants, both Defendant A and Defen-
dant B can remove the case without consent from the other party,
as neither one has been served.123 Likewise, the forum-defendant
rule could not be invoked because neither defendant has been
served.124
In the second configuration (Scenario 2), the plaintiff again files
suit in Virginia state court. The plaintiff serves Defendant A, a cit-
izen of Maryland, but does not yet serve Defendant B, a citizen of
Virginia. Defendant A then removes the case to federal court before
Defendant B is served. In this situation, Defendant B would be
unable to effectively voice its lack of consent or assert the forum-
119. See Encompass Ins. Co., 902 F.3d at 153-54; Sheldon, 502 F. App’x at 770.
120. See § 1446(b)(2)(A); see also STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3730.
121. See Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 441-43.
122. See id. at 446-47.
123. See id. at 447-49.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
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defendant rule because it remains unserved as the forum defen-
dant.125
In a third and final configuration (Scenario 3), the plaintiff once
again files suit in Virginia state court. The plaintiff similarly serves
Defendant A, a citizen of Maryland, but does not yet serve Defen-
dant B, a citizen of Virginia. Defendant B then removes the case to
federal court before being served. The major distinction here from
Scenario 2 is that the forum defendant is the one removing the case
to federal court. This situation is particularly likely because one of
the ways snap removal occurs is when the served defendant informs
the unserved defendant of the impending lawsuit.126 As in Scenarios
1 and 2, the forum-defendant rule cannot be invoked because the
Virginia citizen has not been served.127 Unlike Scenarios 1 and 2,
Defendant A would be able to block Defendant B’s removal by not
consenting, as Defendant A has already been served.128
C. Evaluation of Textualist Outcomes
The necessity of consent or lack thereof in the above examples
largely illustrates the impact of the unanimity rule on served and
unserved defendants. However, emphasizing the ability of one de-
fendant to cause a procedural defect in each of these situations
begins to highlight the contradictory outcomes that these interpreta-
tions could create in tandem.
Compare Scenario 1 with Scenario 3. Further, assume in both
situations that the nonforum defendant has a reason to want to
keep the case in state court. In Scenario 3, in which consent is
required, the nonforum defendant is free to exercise its ability to
deny removal, giving effect to its own litigation strategy as well as
the plaintiff’s choice of forum. In Scenario 1, the nonforum defen-
dant is at the whim of the forum defendant. The forum defendant
can remove at its sole discretion, so long as it acts before service can
be made. The particularly puzzling component here is that the
125. For an example of a similar scenario, see Watanabe v. Lankford, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1210,
1212-14 (D. Haw. 2010).
126. See Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 447-48.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
128. See Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 443.
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forum-defendant rule exists to exempt the forum defendant from the
ability to choose,129 and yet, the overlap between snap removal and
the rule of unanimity can create a factual situation where the forum
defendant is the only party with the ability to choose between
federal and state court.130 Therefore, the current state of the snap
removal and rule of unanimity doctrines could give rise to outcomes
that create the exact opposite effect of the operative statutes’
purpose and overall scheme.131
This outcome conflicts not only with the thrust of the forum-
defendant rule, but with the purpose of the individual phrase being
interpreted in these cases as well. As previously noted, the “properly
joined and served” language attempts to exempt from both statutes
any attempt at nominal or fraudulent joinder designed to defeat
removal.132 For the rule of unanimity specifically, this was mainly
to codify the federal judiciary’s history of relaxing the rule where
necessary.133 In the examples described above, a relaxation of the
rule of unanimity is neither necessary nor helpful to limit the ap-
plication of nominal or fraudulent joinder.134 In fact, a nominally or
fraudulently joined codefendant would have little reason to oppose
removal in any circumstance, as the defendant has no good faith
basis to believe it will be held liable and, therefore, no reason to be
engaged in the litigation at all.135
Admittedly, this contradiction between practice and purpose
would require the perfect storm of inputs to be brought directly
before a federal court: (1) diversity jurisdiction; (2) a snap-removing
forum defendant; and most importantly, (3) a nonconsenting, non-
forum defendant. However, the fact that this anomaly impacts a
smaller number of defendants presents no reason to view it as any
less important of a consideration; the impact on an individual or
entity is not diminished by the fact that there are only a small
129. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 3723.
130. See supra Part III.B.
131. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b)(2), 1446(b)(2)(A); STEINMAN ET AL., supra note 14, §§ 3723,
3730.
132. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b)(2), 1446(b)(2)(A); see discussion supra Part I.C.
133. See Ressler, supra note 73, at 1402-05.
134. Recall that both defendants in the given scenario are joined in good faith, neither
nominally nor fraudulently. See discussion supra Part III.B.
135. See C.L.B. v. Frye, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1116 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
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number of those individuals or entities. Additionally, the snap re-
moval and rule of unanimity doctrines are ultimately questions of
statutory interpretation.136 In that context, it is possible, beneficial,
and arguably necessary to look beyond the instant case and deter-
mine what the intended interpretation could mean for future cases
under different facts.137
Although the aforementioned case may be narrow in scope, a sim-
ilar case has been decided: Watanabe v. Lankford.138 The plaintiff in
Watanabe was a citizen of Japan, and codefendants Lankford and
Terminix were citizens of Hawaii and Delaware, respectively.139
Watanabe brought the claim on the basis of diversity jurisdiction in
Hawaii state court, where the case would have remained if the
forum-defendant rule was observed, due to Lankford’s citizenship.140
Instead, defendant Terminix snap-removed the case to the District
of Hawaii before Lankford could be served.141 Applying the rule of
unanimity’s judicially created apathy toward unserved defendants,
the court held that Terminix could unilaterally remove the case
without Lankford’s consent and without implicating the forum-
defendant rule.142 Notice that these facts mimic Scenario 2 of the
examples discussed in Part III.B, clearly falling on the side of not
requiring consent to removal through either the pre-2011 judge-
made doctrine or the post-2011 statutory provisions.143 The potential
perfect storm of inputs seems incredibly plausible based on the facts
of Watanabe.144 In fact, Watanabe would have been the exact afore-
mentioned case had the plaintiff brought the claim in Delaware’s
state courts instead of Hawaii’s—that is, ignoring the other poten-
tial problems with doing so, such as venue and personal
jurisdiction.145 Now that snap removal has received broader
136. See, e.g., Tex. Brine Co. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, 955 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2020); Gibbons
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 2019).
137. See Watanabe v. Lankford, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216 (D. Haw. 2010).
138. See id. at 1212-14.
139. Id. at 1214.
140. See id. at 1215-16.
141. Id. at 1214-15.
142. See id. at 1215-20.
143. See id.; see also discussion supra Part III.B.
144. See 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1211-14.
145. See id.; discussion supra Part III.C.
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approval from multiple appellate circuits,146 a lawsuit generating
the inconsistency noted here could be on the near horizon.
IV. A NONLEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Commentators predominantly call for legislative reform of the
operative statutes to resolve the “snap removal loophole.”147 This
Part argues that the potential for a case outcome such as the one
identified in the preceding Part III.C could increase the likelihood
of a judicial fix rather than a legislative one.
A. Proposed Judicial Approach
Highlighting an inconsistency between practice and purpose
resolves nothing in isolation; a change in the current snap removal
doctrine can be achieved only if that inconsistency can be given
meaning through the courts’ interpretative framework.148 Given that
snap removal and the rule of unanimity must both be analyzed
through the same “properly joined and served” language,149 the gen-
eral rules of statutory interpretation should be noted. As the snap
removal cases themselves make clear, federal courts must first at-
tempt a “plain meaning” approach when interpreting legislation,
giving effect to the natural meaning of the words of the individual
statute while keeping in mind the overall statutory scheme.150
However, the courts depart from the plain meaning approach if
it creates a result that is absurd.151 Absurd results tend to fall into
a handful of categories: (1) creating conflict between provisions of
the same statute, (2) rendering a law unenforceable, (3) opposing
clear legislative history, or (4) defeating the purpose of a general
statutory scheme.152 The district court split on snap removal illus-
trates how different jurisdictions produce varying answers to the
146. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Nannery, supra note 55, at 575.
148. See id. at 570-71.
149. See Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 153-54 (3d Cir.
2018); Sheldon v. Khanal, 502 F. App’x 765, 770 (10th Cir. 2012).
150. See Watanabe v. Lankford,  684 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216 (D. Haw. 2010).
151. See, e.g., id.
152. Id.
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same question: whether or not evading the forum-defendant rule
through lack of service is an absurd result.153 Although a number of
courts have determined that snap removal is absurd on its own,154
the previously noted inconsistency created through the overlap with
the rule of unanimity further tips the scales in favor of snap re-
moval being an absurd result.
Allowing snap removal in the contradictory scenarios from Part
III.B “thwart[s] the purpose of the over-all statutory scheme,”155
creating an absurd result. The forum-defendant rule divests a
resident defendant of its ability to remove a case;156 the rule of
unanimity ensures that nonresident codefendants have equal
power to consent to removal.157 In both cases, Congress included the
specific language of “properly joined and served” to negate a
plaintiff’s ability to affect either of those purposes in bad faith.158 In
contrast to this scheme, the prevailing interpretation of this
language can give a forum defendant sole discretion over removal,
at least when both codefendants are joined in good faith but not
served.159 When viewed together, the overlap between snap removal
and the rule of unanimity creates an absurd result that would not
exist otherwise. In essence, it thwarts the broader purpose of two
statutory rules with one blow. Thus, the proposed approach adds
further support to the position taken by disapproving district courts:
snap removal creates an absurd result as a matter of statutory
interpretation.160
Those opposed to this approach would likely cite the reasoning
provided by the appellate circuits: the result of the interpretation
being outside the bounds of what Congress intended does not in-
herently create an absurd outcome.161 However, defeating the
purpose of a statutory scheme is an absurd result as a matter of
153. Compare id. at 1218-19, with Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734-35 (N.D.
Ill. 2007).
154. See, e.g., Vivas, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 734-35.
155. See Watanabe, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1216 (quoting United States ex rel. Barajas v. United
States, 258 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001)).
156. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
157. See § 1446(b)(2)(A).
158. See Ressler, supra note 73, at 1397-98.
159. See discussion supra Part III.C.
160. See, e.g., Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734-35 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
161. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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interpretation.162 Through the contradiction described above, the
statutory scheme surrounding the forum-defendant rule has not
only been defeated, it has been twisted to the exact opposite of
its purpose.163 The overlap between snap removal and the rule of
unanimity can empower a forum defendant to unilaterally decide
whether a case will be heard in federal court; yet, the purpose of
the statutory scheme is to inhibit the defendant’s ability to be in
federal court at all.164 This outcome exceeds simply being contrary
to congressional intent and extends into the territory of absurd.
B. Comparison to Other Approaches
Taking a judicial approach provides an additional and immediate
level of efficacy not present in the legislative approaches suggested
by other scholars.165 Namely, it ensures a degree of reliability.166
Appellate circuits adopting this approach going forward could create
a circuit split with the current circuits approving snap removal.167
This would set the stage for the Supreme Court to weigh in on the
issue directly, potentially creating a uniform precedent that would
hopefully align the fragmented district courts regardless of the
outcome.168 Of course, the legislative approaches to reforming snap
removal supersede any courts’ decisions on the matter, but the de-
bate over the propriety of snap removal has continued for nearly two
decades with no action from Congress.169 The judicial approach pre-
sents an immediate and necessary opportunity to clarify the courts’
procedural mechanisms without waiting on legislation.
Notwithstanding the probability of such a solution arriving, pro-
ponents of the legislative approach tout its expediency and finality
162. See Watanabe v. Lankford, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216 (D. Haw. 2010).
163. See Nannery, supra note 55, at 550-56.
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
165. Stempel et al. indicate that legislation may be a secondary choice in the absence of
Supreme Court authority. See Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 430.
166. See generally Nannery, supra note 55, at 575 (“While the current statute’s text and
history can be and has been read to not permit removal of diversity cases if no defendant has
been served ... courts continue to reach different conclusions.”).
167. See Hellman et al., supra note 55, at 106-07.
168. See id.
169. See Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 450-52.
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compared to a judicial fix.170 However, a judicial approach could be
preferable, not just a second-best option,171 despite what relevant
scholarship would seem to suggest.172 Admittedly, adjusting the
statutory language could eliminate the interpretation question of
snap removal altogether.173 However, the unintended consequences
of adjusting legislation could create new problems.174 As the 2011
removal statute amendments show, newfound ambiguity in modi-
fied legislation can create unforeseen outcomes.175 If Congress were
to create another open question by adding language to the removal
statutes, this ongoing debate on snap removal could begin anew
with a different loophole or workaround.176 In contrast, binding
precedent declaring snap removal inconsistent with the existing
statute would have the simple effect of cutting off the problem
without adjusting the source material.177 Therefore, the judiciary’s
ability to craft a narrow ruling presents an avenue to create a
tailored and specific solution without the potential pitfalls of a
legislative fix.
CONCLUSION
Appellate circuits have started weighing in on the district court
split regarding the propriety of snap removal, uniformly in favor of
the practice so far.178 However, courts and commentators alike op-
pose the existence of the statutory loophole to the forum-defendant
rule, even when they feel compelled to approve of it through ju-
dicial interpretation.179 The rule of unanimity overlaps with snap
170. See, e.g., Hellman et al., supra note 55, at 108.
171. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
172. See Hellman et al., supra note 55, at 108.
173. See id. at 106-08.
174. See generally Ressler, supra note 73, at 1406-09 (discussing the unintended conse-
quences of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011).
175. See id.
176. Cf. id. at 1401-07 (explaining that the 2011 attempt to resolve ambiguity regarding
removal timing, for example, effectively created statutory opportunities for unfair strategic
behavior).
177. See Stempel et al., supra note 6, at 430, 476-83.
178. See discussion supra Part I.C.
179. See discussion supra Part I.D.
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removal significantly and presents an opportunity to align juris-
prudence with that negative sentiment. Through a specific factual
scenario implicating both doctrines, contradictions can be drawn
between their application and the purposes of their statutory
schemes.180 These contradictions create an absurd result that lends
further credence to a federal court’s reasoning for departing from a
plain meaning interpretation of the operative statutes. Reversing
the appellate trend through this judicial interpretation approach
provides an alternative to proposed legislative amendments, cre-
ating an immediate fix for a problem well within the purview of the
federal courts.
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